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I swear by Apollo the physician and Aesculapius, and Health,
and All-heal, and all the gods and goddesses, that, according
to my ability and judgment, I will keep this Oath and this
stipulation ... I will follow that system of regimen which,
according to my ability and judgment, I consider for the
benefit of my patients, and abstain from whatever is deleteri-
ous and mischievous.
Hippocrates'
I. INTRODUCTION: VIRTUAL CLINICS
Imagine the following scenario: "The doctor will see you now," is emitted
from a computer's speakers as a patient clicks on the virtual clinic icon on her
desktop computer while she is on her coffee break at work. During this fifteen
minute break, the patient consults her doctor who makes a diagnosis and
prescribes treatment, all over a digital connection.
Virtual medical clinics are fast becoming a virtual reality. Using
teleconferencing technologies, telemedicine providers connect patients and
doctors in a digital environment. Thus, a patient can seek medical advice and
treatment via personal computer. Commercial adaptation of this new mode of
medical treatment requires a new legal framework for analysis.
This Note comparatively analyzes current legal models in the United States,
Canada, and Australia and advocates the development of a legal system
tailored to modem and future telemedicine practices. Such a system will
create an environment of certainty, which in turn will contribute to capital
investment in beneficial technological and organizational models. Specifi-
* J.D. 2002, University of Georgia.
See Hippocrates, Hippocratic Oath. Contrary to popular conception, the phrase, "First,
do no harm," is not now, nor has it ever been, a part of the Hippocratic Oath to which doctors
pledge. See generally "First, Do No Harm" Is Not in the Hippocratic Oath, at http://www.
geocities.coni.everwild7/noharm.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2001); see also Dennis Gersten,
M.D., AMA Hippocratic Oath, at http://www.imagerynet.com/hippo.ama.html (last visited Sept.
4,2001).
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cally, this Note reviews the legal barriers to a corporate provider of
telemedicine in the three above-mentioned nations.
II. ANALYTICAL BACKGROUND
A. Health Care Innovation Markets
Technological innovations, both mechanical and organizational, have
affected all aspects of our lives. With the advent of newer and quicker
methods of communication, we are able to communicate across borders and
vast expanses at the speed of light. Larger and more specialized organizations
capture and distribute economies of scale that were once considered impossi-
ble. The practice of medicine is not immune to such changes. Telecommuni-
cations systems can transmit and receive information from distant medical
experts and databases, increasing overall access to valuable health information.
Health care organizations consisting of doctors, administrators, nurses, and
citizens have the potential to increase the overall health and wealth of
organization members. Indeed, the Internet is a vast source of health-related
information and services
Health innovations also present disadvantages. An increase in the
availability of health information necessarily leads to the distribution of
suspect and unreliable information to a large number of people. Likewise,
health care organizations are often derided for being bureaucratic and
inflexible. Thus, innovations may lead to a short-term decrease in output
quality.
Often, the mechanical technology of a potential innovation exists long
before the organizational technology can respond with a complementary
approach necessary to eliminate economic, legal, and social barriers to the
successful introduction of the technology. Conversely, society is often
organized and waiting for mechanical technology, but such mechanical
breakthrough lags behind our organizational readiness. The impetus for
innovation may be private industry's quest for profit or governmental
intervention to improve social welfare. Industry and government may walk
2 An estimated sixty million adults used the Web to find health related information in 1998.
See Marlene M. Maheu, Delivering Behavioral Telehealth via the Internet: eHealth, at http://
telehealth.net/articles/deliver.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2001); see also Service-Growth
Consultants, Canada Healthkeepers to the World: Canadian Opportunities in Global Telehealth
Markets, Study prepared for Industry Canada, Health Industries Branch, March 1998 (noting that
the demand for online health information, estimated at over $800 billion in 2000, has led to
estimates that at least ten percent of the total World Wide Web content is related to health care).
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hand-in-hand, take parallel paths to the same endpoint, or travel in opposite
directions. This dynamic between industry's response to market forces and
government's normative approach to social engineering is what shapes the
processes and uses of technology.
According to neoclassical economic theory, a perfectly competitive market
needs little governmental intervention because market forces will determine
the social utility of a product or service. However, innovation markets are
rarely perfectly competitive because barriers to entry (economic and legal)
inhibit the entrance of technological breakthroughs. A small businessman
wishing to introduce a socially useful innovation may lack access to capital
markets or may be discouraged by anti-competitive practices of marketers of
current (and inferior) technologies. Likewise, because consumers and
producers do not possess perfect information, market availability may not
reflect consumer preference.
Government intervenes legislatively through the passage of laws that seek
to correct market imperfections, administratively through the application of
laws, and judicially as the arbiter of the laws as applied to unique and often
unanticipated factual circumstances. The goal of governmental regulation of
innovation markets is the improvement of aggregate social welfare and
individual utility maximization.
Such regulation may take the form of a carrot-like incentive. For example,
the government may provide tax breaks for those who devote capital to the
research and design of new products or award a patent to the first innovator of
a unique product to provide an incentive to devote capital to innovation. These
types of regulations function to internalize positive externalities by rewarding
the creators of potential long-term public gains with short-term private gains
or by eliminating free-rider competitors who seek to capitalize on another's
investment in innovation. Regulation of innovation markets may also take the
form of stick-like disincentives. For example, a patent infringer may be
punished or new inventions may be required to be compatible with current
technologies. These negative regulations seek to achieve a smooth transition
to new technological innovations by creating market certainty and setting
standards of compatibility.
B. Context of Analysis: Corporate Telemedicine
This Note is a comparative analysis of the United States, Australia, and
Canada with respect to the legal barriers to the following situation: (1) the
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practice of clinical telemedicine; (2) by a corporation; (3) that provides a
digital medium; (4) for the exchange of information; (5) between a patient; and
(6) a doctor with whom the patient has a prior relationship.'
Doctor Goodwell, Inc. provides an interesting context for analysis.4 The
Microsoft Corporation is currently partnered with Doctor Goodwell in the
development of a prototype and pilot implementation of an Intemet/Intranet-
based solution for the delivery of healthcare information and services to
employees of client corporations.' Doctor Goodwell will contract with these
employers to provide the technology, training, medical provider networks and
long-term support needed to manage better their healthcare costs, and will
work to enhance the health, well-being, and productivity of the corporate
clients' workforce. 6 From the corporate workplace, employees will access the
system by dialing into the "virtual medical clinic" from a central and
ostensibly secure site reserved for Doctor Goodwell applications, which
include the delivery of targeted medical knowledge, e-mail consultations and
a video-based "virtual office visit" to connect employees and their doctors.7
Doctor Goodwell acknowledges that it cannot replace all in-office doctor
visits, but predicts it can effectively move approximately twenty percent or
more of these visits to videoconferencing or e-mails.8 Such a service would
secure convenient provision of healthcare to employees and at the same time
increase their productivity on behalf of the corporate client/employer. 9
Employers will become Doctor Goodwell clients, and the corporation will pay
for the visits as part of an employee benefits program.'" Doctor Goodwell
would open the system to any physicians interested in participating, and the
company hopes that employees would be able to integrate and retain their pre-
existing relationship with their personal physicians."
Naturally, employees will only be able to consult remotely with those
physicians who choose to participate in Doctor Goodwell's healthcare system.
See Robert Milstein, An International, Comparative Analysis of Policy, Regulatory and
Medico-legal Obstacles and Solutions, (Jan. 1999) http://www.dhs.vic.gov.au/ahs/telemed/
execsum.htm (visited Sept. 4, 2001) (noting that telernedicine is not "(a] single technology or
a discrete set of related technologies; it is, rather, a large and very heterogeneous collection of
clinical practices, technologies, and organizational arrangements").
See http://www.doctorgoodwell.net (visited Sept. 4, 2001).
' See id.
6 See id.
See id.
8 See id.
See http://www.doctorgoodwell.net (visited Sept. 4, 2001).
10 See id.
" See id.
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A physician's choice to participate depends on a number of factors including
the remuneration scale, the physician's degree of autonomy, the utility and
efficacy of the system, and other market factors such as patient demand.
Likewise, the presence of significant network externalities creates a positive
feedback process in which the value of the system increases with the number
of users. A successful network would tend to have more users, which in turn
would create incentives for internal or external network plug-ins. Thus, the
scalability of system applications would have great influence on the growth of
a digitally-based healthcare system. Likewise, the degree of government
regulation and cooperation will significantly impact the availability of digital
health networks.
C. The Commonality of the United States, Australia, and Canada
Although the United States, Australia, and Canada have different social
policies and practices regarding the relationships between industry and
government, a comparative analysis of the countries' telemedicine policies and
regulatory environments is quite revealing, 2 especially considering that
Australia in particular models much of its telemedicine legal policy after that
of the United States, which provides a forum for experimentation. 3 All three
nations face similar situations: a legal system evolved from the British
common-law system, a relatively well-connected population," geographically
diffuse populations, distribution of health resources that does not match
population needs, a rapidly aging population, and a dramatic rise in the cost of
healthcare, 5 all of which lead to uneven access to healthcare and an increase
12 See D.G. Breaden & E. Smith,A Reporton the First International Conferenceon Medical
Licensure Registration and Discipline, v. 81 no. 4 FEDERATION BULLETIN 243, 247 (1994)
(arguing that the "close of the millennium has brought an era in which no nation can ignore the
lessons to be learned through sharing of experience, information, research and insights with
others around the world"); see also Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria (MPBV) Annual
Report for 1997, 4 (1997) (recognizing the "benefit of being aware of new and effective
approaches to the regulations of the medical profession developed in other jurisdictions").
13 See Milstein, supra note 3.
4 The United States and Canada are currently experiencing the transition to broadband. See
Report on Telemedicine, 4.3.7., at http://biomant.die.unina.it/teleplans-doc/WP4_index.htm
(last visited Sept. 4, 2001). Along with eight Asian countries, Australia is linked to a 12,000
kilometer submarine fiber optic cable known as the Asia Pacific Cable Network (APCN). See
Life Sciences Branch-Health Industries Canadian International Business Strategy (CIBS)
(1999-2000), at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ht0195e.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2001).
IS While Canadian expenditures in the health services sector rose forty-one percent from
$56.7 billion in 1997 to $80.0 billion in 1999, the U.S. health care industry is worth over $1
trillion. See CIBS, supra note 14.
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in the rate of chronic as opposed to acute health problems. 16 In each country,
a profit-oriented business model is replacing the traditional health-oriented
model.' 7 Thus, an increased emphasis is placed upon efficiency in the delivery
of health services.' 8
While similarities abound, and the U.S. system exerts "a powerful influence
on Australia" 9 and Canada, there are, however, important regional differences
in the practice of medicine. The health systems in Australia and Canada have
traditionally been steeped in socialism, while the U.S. system has long been
market-driven. This difference has had a number of implications including
varying levels of government participation in the development of
telemedicine,2° a greater market for research and development of new medical
technologies in the United States,2 and distinct treatment recommendations.22
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. History of Telemedicine
Doctors have long taken advantage of communications technology. For
instance, the medical profession began using the telephone as a consultation
"' See Milstein, supra note 3.
'7 See id.
" See id. (noting that each country is trying to "do more with less").
'9 See S.J. Duckett, Health Care in the US: What Lessonsfor Australia? vii. (The Australian
Centre for American Studies, University of Sydney 1997).
20 See Report on Telemedicine, supra note 14. In Australia particularly, a large majority of
telemedicine projects are sponsored by governmental entities, both national and regional. Id.
at 5.1.3.1.1.
22 See CANADIAN SOCIETY OF TELEHEALTH, CANADIAN STRENGTHS AND INTERNATIONAL
OPPORTUNITIES INTELEHEALTH: OBSERVATIONS FROM THE G7-G8 SP4 FoRuM: MEDICALILEGAL
ASPECTS OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TELEHEALTH APPLICATIONS, (Jan. 2, 2000),
available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/it05376e.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2001) (noting that
"Canada's single-payer health care system puts a damper on the development of the entrepre-
neurial side of telehealth... Particular telemedicine applications may be cost effective, but it
will take some time to determine which applications are cost effective. Governments will not
be willing to provide telemedicine services that are not cost effective, and because of the single-
payer system Canadians may not pay privately for insured services provided by telemedicine"
even though "[s]ome waiting lists could be reduced or eliminated by using telemedicine.").
22 See E. Haavi Morreim, Playing Doctor: Corporate Medical Practice and Medical
Malpractice, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 939,992 (1999) (discussing the reasons that U.S. physicians
recommend coronary angiography and revascularization (cardiac bypass surgery) more often
than Canadian physicians. Some of the proffered explanations include more widespread
availability of facilities and trained personnel in the United States.).
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tool shortly after the device's inception. 3 In Canada in 1956, Dr. Feindel, a
Saskatoon neurosurgeon used a closed circuit television system to transmit live
electrocorticography tracings."' However, most sophisticated telemedicine
projects were initially undertaken by governmental organizations. 2, For
instance, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
developed a system for the remote monitoring of U.S. astronauts in the
1970s. ' 6 More recently, telemedicine has been used as a teaching tool to
provide distance learning, as a conduit of medical services to rural populations,
for consultations with distant experts, in the context of home health care, as an
automated psychologist, 2" and for the provision of health care to prison
populations.28
B. Current State of Telemedicine
With the advent of the Internet, the potentials of telemedicine 9 have
increased exponentially. As teleconferencing technologies have become more
sophisticated and less expensive, new and improved telemedicine applications
have become technologically and economically feasible. For instance, it is
now possible and affordable to install teleconferencing technologies on an
' See Joel D. Howell, Making Medical Practice in an Uneasy World. Some Thoughts from
a Century Ago, 72 ACAD. MED. 977, 978 (1997).
" See Report on Telemedicine, supra note 14, at 5.2.2.
' See id.
26 See Charles R. Doarn et al., Applications of Telemedicine in the United States Space
Program, 4 TELEMEDICINE J. 19, 19-20 (1998); see also Patricia C. Kuszler, Telemedicine and
Integrated Health Care Delivery: Compounding Malpractice Liability, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 297,
300-01, 1999 (discussing how NASA's program was modified by its collaboration with the
Indian Health Service and the Papago Indian Tribe to connect underserved rural populations to
distant health services, and how later, NASA participation in an international telemedicine
project, created a "spacebridge" between the United States and Russia).
27 See Robert Friedman, M.D., Totally Automated Telehealth Systems to Deliver Health
Behavior Change Interventions, available at http://telehealth.net/articles/automated.html (last
visited Sept. 4, 200 1) (describing an automated telephone-linked-computer (TLC) that interacts
with callers to assist with behavioral changes such as the cessation of smoking or diet
maintenance through behavioral reinforcement comprised of assessment of behavior, behavior
intervention, and behavior goal setting).
, See id.
29 The term "telemedicine" is a sub-species of the term "eHealth," which refers to all forms
of electronic healthcare delivered over the Internet, ranging from informational, educational and
commercial "products" to direct services offered by professionals, non-professionals, businesses
or consumers themselves. eHealth includes a wide variety of the clinical activities that have
traditionally characterized telehealth, but delivered through the Internet. See Maheu, supra note
2.
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individual basis rather than limiting access to large and well-funded entities.3"
This progress has the potential to individualize health care by affording more
choice and flexibility to patients. However, efforts to marry medicine and
information technology have encountered some resistance."
C. Barriers to the Availability of Digital Health Systems
A prospective provider of a digital health system faces a number of
potential barriers. First, if the digital system fails, the provider may face
damages based on a products liability claim. Second, defects in organization
could result in liability similar to recent attempts to hold health maintenance
organizations (HMOs) and managed care organizations (MCOs) liable for
harm to system members. Third, licensure at the state level could prevent the
transfer of digital health care across state lines. Fourth, reimbursement issues,
intertwined with anti-kickback statutes, put restrictions on the payment of
funds to induce referrals under government healthcare programs. Fifth, similar
to anti-kickback provisions, self-referral prohibitions at both the federal and
state levels present potential barriers to the provision of clinical telemedicine.
Sixth, regulatory agencies could restrict the marketing and distribution of
digitally-based healthcare systems. Seventh, privacy and confidentiality
concerns regarding the storage and dissemination of patient records is gaining
increasing attention by lawmakers and has spawned an entire industry devoted
to digital rights management. Other issues beyond the scope of this Note
include equal access concerns that may require some regulation to ensure that
'0 See, e.g., CNET- Shopping- Latest Prices, available at http://shopper.cnet.com/shopping/
resellers/0-7085-311-2 141286.html?tag=st.sh.sr.mp.pr2141286 (last visited Sept. 4,200 1) (web
cameras available for less than one-hundred dollars).
3' A survey of 257 family practitioners, general practitioners and internists revealed that
while 41% were very interested in using the Internet to practice medicine remotely, such as-
through an audiovisual link, physician interest in telemedicine in the immediate future is limited.
(Only 33% of the physicians expressed significant interest in using the Internet for communicat-
ing with patients, consulting with colleagues, participating in clinical trials or filing patient
insurance claims. Only 27% believe the Internet will save the health system money in the next
five years; less than 50% feel it will improve physician-patient communication. And, while
many companies are currently developing technology platforms for writing prescriptions online,
the survey revealed that few physicians (19%) are actually very interested in using this
application in the future) See Web Survey MD: Update on Physicians and the Internet, at http:II
websurveymd.mt01 .com/UpdatePhysiciansIntemet.shtml (last visited Sept. 4, 2001).
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patients on the wrong side of the "digital divide" have access to digital health
systems and the distribution of prescriptions over the Internet,32 an increas-
ingly hot topic.
Each of the barriers to telemedicine in the United States is further
complicated by the fact that telemedicine has been the focus of increased,
noncomprehensive, and nonuniform federal legislative activity during the
105th" and 106th 34 Congresses. Further illustrating the legislative patchwork
regulation of telemedicine in the United States is the fact that during 1999
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Virginia, among other states, considered
telemedicine legislation.3"
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Liability as Analogous to Medical Device Failures
The danger with introducing new technology is twofold: (1) in the event of
a technology failure, the provider may be liable for any harm resulting
therefrom; and (2) the availability of technology can increase user expecta-
tions, thereby raising the level of the minimum standard of care courts will
require.36 Thus, a provider oftelemedicine will want to characterize its service
32 See generally Sean P. Haney, PharmaceuticalDispensing in the "Wild West ": Advancing
Health Care and Protecting Consumers Through the Regulation ofOnline Pharmacies, 42 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 575 (Dec. 2000).
" See Julie A. Braun et al., Recent Developments in Medicine and Law, 35 TORT & INS. L.J.
487, 543 (2000) (noting activity in the 105th Congress, including more than twenty proposals
or acts).
14 See id. at 543 n.574 (noting for example: "Access to Quality Care Act of 1999, H.R. 216,
106th Cong. (1999); Triple-A Rural Health Improvement Act of 1999, H.R. 1344, 106th Cong.
(1999); The Comprehensive Telehealth Act of 1999, S. 770, 106th Cong. (1999); Promoting
Health in Rural Areas Act of 1999, S. 980, 106th Cong. (1999); S. Res. 86, 105th Cong. (1998)
(expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to access charges for Internet use and the growth
of advanced interactive communications networks like the Internet")).3 See id. at 543-45 (noting extensive legislative activity at the state level).
36 See Kuszler, supra note 26, at 316-17 (describing such a phenomenon as a "double-edged
sword" because it could result in "liability for failing to install a technology that is now
'standard' and liability for any malfunction or misuse of the technology that results in harm to
the patient."); see also Monua Janah, Health Care by Cisco, INFO. WK., Feb. 23, 1998, at 116,
available at 1998 WL 2358723 (voicing concern that the risk of telemedicine is compounded
by a shortage of network professionals and unreliability of the network.); see also Jay H.
Sanders & Rashid L. Bashshur, Challenges to the Implementation of Telemedicine, 1
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as the provision of a space to be used by a doctor and a patient, similar to a
real estate lessor who provides the physical space for a doctor's clinic.
However, a virtual clinic, as defined in this Note,37 goes beyond merely
providing a space; it involves interactive applications that may be subject to
technical errors that could result in faulty transmissions. If an error results in
patient harm, the provider may be liable, as a real estate lessor would be if
failure to maintain the physical property results in patient harm when a ceiling
collapses. Just as formal characterization of the service does not relieve the
telemedicine provider of liability, the transfer of title of the equipment from
the provider to the physician will not immunize the provider, especially if in
charge of maintenance and operation of the information system. Thus, liability
for telemedicine failure is not unlike liability for the failure of other medical
devices.
The United States, being more litigious than Canada and Australia, is much
more likely to host lawsuits regarding telemedicine.38 Nonetheless, commen-
tators in Canada have urged policy makers to address issues regarding product
standards, which are especially important because many telemedicine
technologies were originally designed for other uses such as
videoconferencing.39 In Australia, it is argued that a telemedicine provider's
failure to warn of the material risks of a telemedical consultation would be
analogous to a doctor's failure to warn a patient about the risks of a traditional
medical treatment.' °
TELEMEDICINE J. 115, 120 (1995) (discussing telemedicine and the standard of care).
" See Milstein, supra note 3.
3 See id. (suggesting that Australian policy makers might adopt a wait-and-see attitude to
model its treatment of telemedicine on policies adopted in U.S. courts, the "litigation capital of
the world"); see also Industry Canada--Information & Communications Technologies, The
Telehealth Industry in Canada:Canadian Capacity to Respond to Traditional Telehealth
Markets, (visited Sept. 4, 2001) http://strategis.ic.gc.caSSG/itO5495e.htrl (stating that "the
authors know of no incident, which has been brought to court in Canada, which might hinder
the deployment or development of telehealth").
" See Domenic A. Crolla, Health Care Without Walls: Responding to Telehealth's
Emerging Legal Issues, 19 HEALTH L. IN CAN. 1, 1-32 (Aug. 1998) (urging the Canadian
government to classify telehealth instruments as medical devices, which would create an
environment of certainty due to the establishment of clear standards for use).
" See Rogers v. Whitaker (1992) 175 C.L.R. 479, 490 ("[A] risk is material if, in the
circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person in the patient's position, if warned of
the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it or if the medical practitioner [or the
telemedicine provider?] is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient, if warned
of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it").
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In the United States, liability may take the form of simple negligence or
negligence based on res ipsa loquitur." Under both types of liability, all
involved parties may share liability.' 2 Likewise, a patient may even try suing
an Internet service provider (ISP) on which the telemedicine provider relies.
An ISP, however, would probably escape liability on public policy grounds
because to hold it liable for intermittent failures of information transmission
could result in such extraordinarily high levels of liability that no one would
provide Internet services at a reasonable cost.43 A telemedicine provider could
argue that this same rationale justifies its immunity from liability for network
errors." A court would probably (and should) take this into account when
judging the reasonableness of the provider's actions. Thus, the duty of care
may reflect the value, uniqueness, and availability of the service provided.
This reasoning is also applicable if the provider is sued under a theory of
institutional liability, as discussed below.
B. Institutional Liability
Telemedicine is unique among medical devices because it requires a
common network shared by multiple users. The network infrastructure cannot
possibly be supplied by individual physicians or their patients because it relies
" See, e.g., Shepardson v. Consol. Med. Equip., Inc., 714 A.2d 1181 (R.I. 1998) (holding
hospital, surgeon, and manufacturer negligent for burn caused by technology failure of
electrocautery); Wiles v. Myerly, 210 N.W.2d 619 (Iowa 1973) (holding surgeon, anesthesiolo-
gist, and hospital liable based on res ipsa loquitur after patient sustained bums from use of
electrocautery).
41 See Anderson v. Somberg, 386 A.2d 413 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (holding that
at least one party must be liable among the physician, hospital, manufacturer, and distributor
when a metal instrument broke off in the patient. The physician and hospital were sued under
negligence theories, while the instrument's distributor and manufacturer were sued on the basis
of warranty and strict liability theories respectively.); see also Airco, Inc. v. Simmons First Nat'l
Bank, 638 S.W.2d 660 (Ark. 1982) (finding liability for the manufacturer of a malfunctioning
artificial breathing machine); see also Kennedy v. McKesson Co., 448 N.E.2d 1332 (N.Y. 1983)
(allowing dentist to recover for claim against manufacturer of anesthetic equipment whose
malfunction resulted in death of dentist's patient).
" Intemet-based communications are so unreliable that there has been consideration of
cell-based technologies, which are considered more reliable. See Janah, supra note 36.
44 Likewise, this rationale would be applicable to individual telemedicine practitioners. See
Phyllis F. Granade & Jay H. Sanders, M.D., Implementing Telemedicine Nationwide: Analyzing
the Legal Issues, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 67, 72-73 (1996) (quoting Lopez v Aziz, 852 S.W.2d 303,
307 (Tex. App. 1993) (arguing that "to expose physicians to... liability for simply conferring
with a colleague would be detrimental in the long run to those seeking competent medical
attention and is contrary to. . . public policy")).
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in large part on the economies of scale that go hand-in-hand with a network
that services a large population of users. It is inevitable that telemedicine
systems will be part of larger systems, probably part of an integrated delivery
system (IDS). 5 An IDS is similar to a MCO or a HMO in that all three types
of entities deliver health care services by affiliating multiple providers and
users in a large corporate structure." The advantages of these corporate
structures include the realization of efficiencies, increase of market share, and
containment of costs. 47  These advantages, however, are coupled with a
disadvantage: the more control that a corporation has over provision of health
care services, the more likely it is to share malpractice liability.4 Especially
in the United States, the threat of malpractice suits can be a great inhibitor to
the provision of telemedicine.49
In the United States, corporate liability first began with hospitals, 0 and has
41 See Kuszler, supra note 26, at 326 n.222 (discussing Rhonda L. Rundle, Tenet and
MedPartners Agree to Form Health Network in Southern California, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10,
1997, at B4 (describing the formation of a health care network including thirty-three hospitals
and more than 4000 physicians, an arrangement that is "one of the most visible examples so far
of how major health-care players are attempting to create big integrated networks that take
advantage of economies of scale to gain market share")); see also CIBS, supra note 14 (noting
that in the United States seventeen percent of the population is enrolled in managed care plans);
but see Report on Telemedicine, supra note 14, at 4.3.8 (noting that "most HMOs are adopting
a 'wait-and-see' policy, insisting upon proven clinical efficiency and cost-effectiveness before
integrating telemedicine as part of their routine health care delivery').
4See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 440-49 (1982)
(discussing the not-so-recent corporatization of U.S. health care); see also Bashshur, supra note
36, at 7 (noting that "only when viewed as a complete and integrated network will
telemedicine's unique distributive capabilities and integrative functions be maximized").
47 See Kuszler, supra note 26, at 319; see also Morreim, supra note 22.
48 In Australia, individual employees may face liability separate from and in addition to the
institution. See Milstein, supra note 3 (arguing that ".. . 'in-house' technical personnel, such as
health information managers, clinical data specialists, document managers and data security
officers, have an increased responsibility and correspondingly an increased 'exposure' in a
telemedical context").
49 Unlike the many telemedicine barriers in the United States, most industrialized countries
are not hindered by excessive threats of malpractice actions. See generally A.C. Dumay,
Medicine in Virtual Environments, 3 TECH. & HEALTH CARE 75, 75-89 (Oct. 1995).
o Until the mid-I 900s, it was common for hospitals to be given charitable immunity for
malpractice that occurred on their property. See Pierce v. Yakima Valley Mem'l Hosp., 260
P.2d 765, 773 (Wash. 1953). This immunity was a vestige of the fact that most hospitals had
been founded and maintained on a charitable basis. See id. at 769. With the transition to not-so-
charitable corporate entities, this immunity eroded. See id. at 770. Thereafter, hospitals often
escaped liability by arguing not that they deserved charitable immunity, but by characterizing
their physicians as independent contractors who merely occupied the physical premises of the
hospital as a "workshop" and simply "borrowed" the hospital employees such as nurses. See
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been recently expanded to include other IDSs." In Australia, duty of care with
respect to an individual healthcare practitioner or a corporate healthcare
institution is determined, as a matter of law, by applying the concepts of
"foreseeability" and "proximity."
52
An organization may face two theories of liability: vicarious liability and
direct liability. 3 Vicarious liability involves a principal-agent relationship
wherein the principal is held legally responsible for negligent acts committed
by the agent while acting for the principal.5' The principal's liability is based
on its position as supervisor/employer of its subsidiary agent, not on the formal
status as employee." Likewise, the importance of characterizing the physician
as an employee of the health organization is less of a critical factor because
doctors have increasingly entered into employment contracts with the
organization. 56 Nonetheless, in order to avoid liability based on ostensible
William Trail & Susan Kelley-Claybrook, Hospital Liability and the Staff Privileges Dilemma,
37 BAYLOR L. REv. 315,322 (1985). The physician was held liable as the decisionmaker. See
Van Hook v. Anderson, 824 P.2d 509, 514 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (discussing the physician as
the "captain of the ship" doctrine).
" See Van Hook v. Anderson, 824 P.2d 509 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting the physician
as the "captain of the ship" doctrine); see also Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d
1321 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992) (discussing the possibility that an MCO
makes a medical decision when it determines whether or not to reimburse a patient for particular
procedures).
2 See Milstein, supra note 3.
13 See Kuszler, supra note 26, at 319 (discussing how the advent of the corporate health
structure "offer[s] an additional set of liability theories for aggrieved plaintiffs").
See KEETON ET AL., PROSSERAND KEETON ON THE LAWOFTORTS § 70,500(5thed. 1984).
ss See id.; see also Barbara Noah, The Managed Care Dilemma: Can Theories of Tort
LiabilityAdapt to the Realities of Cost Containment?, 48 MERCER L. REv. 1219, 1237-38(1997)
(noting that vicarious liability may result under the doctrine of ostensible agency even when the
agent is a non-employee of the principal corporation if the patient reasonably thought the
physician was an employee of the entity); see also Grewe v. Mount Clemens Hosp., 273 N.W.2d
429 (Mich. 1978) (applying ostensible agency in the health care context for one of the first
times); see also Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1987) (discussing the more recent
treatment of ostensible agency in the context of a hospital contracting with emergency room
physicians); see also Clark v. Southview, 628 N.E.2d 46 (Ohio 1994) (holding a hospital liable
for the negligence of an independent contractor, an emergency room physician); see also
Kashishian v. Port, 481 N.W.2d 277, 278 (Wis. 1992) (holding hospital liable under doctrine
of apparent authority for negligence committed by an independent on-call cardiologist).
56 See ARTHUR F. SOUTHWiCK, THE LAWOF HOSPrAL AND HEALTHCARE ADMINISTRATION
546 (2d ed. 1988) (attributing part of the expansion of health care organization liability to an
increase in "the number and frequency of salaried arrangements" between physicians and
hospitals); see also BARRYR. FURROWETAL., HEALTH LAWCASES, MATERIALS ANDPROBLEMS
§ 7-2 (3d ed. 1997) (discussing how the conversion from health plans to managed care plans has
resulted in an increase in the number of organizations directly employing physicians).
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agency, a provider of telemedicine should make every effort to inform patients
that the physicians are not employees of the organization." However, a duty
of care can exist even in the absence of a contract between the provider and the
patient.
55
Ideally, the organization should merely act as an informational conduit
between the patient and the patient's personal physician. That way, the
patient's pre-established relationship with the physician minimizes the risk
that the patient can be said to have reasonably believed that the physician was
employed by the organization. This will avoid application of the ostensible
agency doctrine, but the provider may nonetheless be found liable on the basis
of direct liability.
Direct liability can result when a health organization violates a duty owed
directly to a patient. Duties may arise under the theories of non-delegable
duty, corporate negligence, and defectively designed health care programs. 9
A non-delegable duty includes the provision of services that only the hospital
is able to provide. ° Corporate negligence is intertwined with non-delegable
duty and was first applied to hospitals in the classic case Darling v. Charleston
Community Memorial Hospital.6' Since Darling, the doctrine has gained
increasing acceptance.62 Recently the corporate negligence theory has also
5' See Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1234-35 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988);
see also Schleier v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 876 F.2d 174,
177-78 (D.C. Cir. 1989); but see Raglin v. HMO Illinois, 595 N.E.2d 153, 158 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992) (holding that an IPA is not vicariously liable for physician negligence); Chase v. Indep.
Practice Ass'n, Inc., 583 N.E.2d 251, 254-55 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (declining to hold HMO
liable due to lack of evidence of HMO control over the providers).
"' See Medical Practitioners, in 27-2 [THE LAW OF AUSTRALIA], 13 (LBC Information
Services, 1998).
" See Kuszler, supra note 26, at 320-23 (describing liability for defectively designed health
care programs as "arguably" viable).
'0 See Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1987) (involving hospital's delegation of
the duty to provide emergency care by an independent contractor physician).
6' Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (Il. 1965) (holding hospital
could be negligent for failing to ensure that its independent physicians provided competent care
on the premises); see also Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703,707 (Pa. 1991) (describing
the relationship between corporate negligence and nondelegable duty and noting that the former
theory may give rise to the latter. The court divided a hospital's duties into four categories: (1)
duty of reasonable care to maintain safe and adequate facilities and equipment; (2) duty to select
competent physicians; (3) duty to supervise the practice of medicine on the premises; and (4)
duty to administer institutional safeguards to ensure quality of care.).
6'2 See, e.g., Corleto v. Shore Mem'l Hosp., 350 A.2d 534 (N.J. 1975) (allowing application
of doctrine to hospital who failed to remove incompetent physician); Fridena v. Evans, 622 P.2d
463 (Ariz. 1980) (applying doctrine to hospital's negligent oversight of a physician practicing
on the premises); Elam v. College Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (Ct. App. 1982) (applying
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been used in suits against HMOs.63 The doctrine has even been applied in a
context reminiscent oftelemedicine: an HMO practicing demand management
through the use of a physician giving patients advice over the telephone.
In Shannon v. McNulty, a Pennsylvania court held that an HMO could be
held liable for the death of a baby born prematurely when, over a period of
days and multiple remote consultations, an obstetrician employed by the IMO
advised a pregnant plan member via telephone that she was not experiencing
pre-term labor.6 In dicta, Wickline v. State of California implied that the
corporate negligence doctrine could be expanded to include liability for the
faulty design of a managed care system, and while the expansion has not been
universally accepted, it could be particularly relevant in the telemedicine
context in which a negligently designed system could have a greater impact on
quality of care.65
Thus, to provide an environment conducive to certainty, stability and
quality care for patients, the scope of corporate liability for acts of doctors
using the corporation's telemedicine infrastructure must be explicitly
addressed by statute to determine the proper division of labor between the
physicians and the corporation." Traditional statutory delineations of the duty
doctrine to allow direct recovery against a hospital for acts committed by independent physicians
and surgeons).
63 See, e.g., Shannon v. McNulty, 718 A.2d 828 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (finding "no reason
why the duties applicable to hospitals should not be equally applied to an HMO when that HMO
is performing the same or similar functions as a hospital. When a benefits provider, be it an
insurer or a managed care organization, interjects itself into the rendering of medical decisions
affecting a subscriber's care it must do so in a medically reasonable manner."); McClellan v.
Health Maint. Org. of Pa., 604 A.2d 1053, 1059 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (recognizing that an HMO
could face liability for negligent selection of its contracting physicians and holding that an IPA-
model HMO may have the duty of certifying its physicians' credentials); Dunn v. Praiss, 656
A.2d 413 (N.J. 1995); Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Ill., Inc., 696 N.E.2d 356 (II1. App. Ct.
1998).
" Shannon v. McNulty, 718 A.2d 828 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
6'5 Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App. 1986); see also Kuszler supra note 26, at
322 (noting that while Wickline "has not resulted in a significant line of cases... in the context
of telemedicine 'defects in design' could take on a new meaning and be more fruitful in terms
of producing case law").
6 See Morris v. D.C. Bd. of Med., 701 A.2d 364, 367 (D.C. 1997) (holding that a definition
of "treatment" that included any conduct that merely "[a]ffects," "influences," or "substantially
impacts" on the course of care by others was "so open-ended that it cannot reasonably be
squared with the statutory term," because equating "treat[ment]" with any conduct that
"practically [a]ffects" it in ways potentially involving no exercise of medical judgment, is
contrary to sensible statutory interpretations); see also Morreim, supra note 22, at 1036-39
(arguing that the proper scope of medical malpractice and other tort liability for MCOs can only
be discerned after it is determined what duty of care MCOs owe their subscribers. This question,
2002]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
of care owed by the physician and the ISD were not drafted to encompass
modem and future telemedicine practice methodologies. Malpractice statutes
require legislative reexamination to reflect the reality of telemedicine. This
will create certainty as to the proper role of communication infrastructure
providers, which in turn will further encourage the creation of facilities that are
capable of fairly distributing quality care at an affordable price. If malpractice
standards are not statutorily adopted, providers may be either over-deterred or
under-deterred, depending upon the approach taken by local courts. Courts
should not be making public policy decisions regarding telemedicine because
the legislature is the more appropriate forum for evaluating and weighing the
various and complex advantages and disadvantages of remote medical
communications systems.
Reform proposals often focus on whether the healthcare system interferes
with the autonomy of the physician in recommending a course of medical
treatment. Critics argue that corporations should be allowed to practice
medicine as long as control over medical decisions is retained by licensed
doctors."7 Indeed, a number of states have taken this tack.68 However, the
degree of permissible interference with a doctor's judgment is unclear,
particularly in the context of a telemedicine system, where the system is a self-
in turn, should be guided by a focus on how to deliver good health care rather than by deciding,
ex ante, whom we wish to hold liable when care has gone badly).
67 See Sara Mars, The CorporatePractice ofMedicine:A CallforAction, 7 HEALTH MATRIX
241,251-52,265-66 (1997) (stating "[u]nless a corporation is truly interfering with its employed
physicians' medical judgments, there seems to be no sound basis for the continued blanket and
unconditional prohibition on contractual employment arrangements... The line ofdemarcation
that courts have drawn, based on structure, should be reanalyzed in terms of whether the form
of arrangement is truly interfering with a physician's freedom of action . . ."; see also Michael
A. Dowell, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Prohibition: A DinosaurAwaiting Extinction,
27 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 369, 372 (1994) (arguing that in the corporate employment context,
the "management agreement should clearly acknowledge the physician will have complete
control over matters of diagnosis, treatment, and medical judgment"); see also Lisa Rediger
Hayward, Revising Washington's Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine, 71 WASH. L. REV.
403,428 (1996).
" For instance, South Dakota passed a statute that states that the employment of physicians
does not amount to the practice of medicine so long as the employer does not "i]n any manner,
directly or indirectly, supplant, diminish or regulate the physician's independent judgment
concerning the practice of medicine or the diagnosis and treatment of any patient." S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 36-4- 8.1 (Michie 1999). Similarly, the Texas HMO Act explicitly states that
the act does not "authorize any person to regulate, interfere, or intervene in any manner in the
practice of medicine or any healing art." TEx. INS. CODE ANN. § 20A.29(b) (Vernon,
WESTLAW through 1999 Reg. Sess.). Tennessee has also passed a law exempting hospitals
from application of the corporate practice ban, but requiring that they not interfere with
physicians' independent medical judgment. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 63-6-204(d)(1) (1997).
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described diagnostic tool designed to externally augment a physician's internal
skills. On one hand, the system may provide for early detection of medical
conditions, thereby positively contributing to the practice of preventive
medicine. However, the system may also inhibit a physician's diagnostic
capabilities because a thorough physical examination cannot be conducted
using current remote technologies. A system administrator would argue that
a doctor should know the limits of remote diagnoses and that when a
telemedicine consultation proves to be inconclusive, the doctor should
recommend an in-person follow-up. Thus, a pure telemedicine system,
operating without technological error and without further organizational
restrictions that inhere in IDSs, should not significantly interfere with a
physician's independent judgment.
Whether a digital health provider faces vicarious or direct liability, it may
nonetheless escape liability because some courts have held that if the health
care is provided as part of a self-funded employee benefits program, then
liability is federally preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA). 9 However, ERISA preemption may not immunize the
provider from liability if the actions of the health plan were what precipitated
the negligent medical care. 7° Thus, if telemedicine is provided negligently to
an employee, the underlying claim probably would not be preempted by
ERISA because a medical decision would be centrally involved. But, if
telemedicine facilities are denied altogether, ERISA probably would preempt
the claim because the substantive issue involves a benefits decision. However,
denial of benefits cannot be wholly isolated from the practical impact on the
patients' decisions to seek further treatment."' Some authorities nonetheless
69 See Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316, 317-18 (D.N.J. 1993) (finding ERISA
preemption of a vicarious liability claim made by an employee against her HMO's physician);
see also Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298, 303 (8th Cir. 1993) (preempting a
direct liability claim); see also Corcoran v. United Healthcare, 965 F.2d 1321, 1331 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992) (finding ERISA preemption because the MCO made a
benefits decision that was merely an interpretation of the insurance contract, rather than a
medical decision as to the necessity of the particular procedure involved. The court noted,
however, that a claim might not be preempted if the MCO goes beyond administrative claims-
handling by denying coverage such that the logic of a benefits determination is inapplicable.
While the exact bounds of such a situation are not clear, the court noted that prospective
utilization review decisions have a powerful influence on patient treatment decisions because
the patient often chooses to forego medical care for which he or she bears the cost.).
71 See Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 351-52 (3d Cir. 1995).
71 See Long v. Great West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 957 P.2d 823, 827 (Wyo. 1998), where
the Wyoming Supreme Court noted that in the case of an MCO (and not in the context of
telemedicine) "[a]lthough the attending physician is the ultimate decisionmaker regarding a
patient's treatment, it is, as commentators note, naive to assume that a provider's determination
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explicitly hold that doctors performing utilization reviews72 are not practicing
medicine and, thus, are not subject to "the regulatory, investigatory, or
enforcement authority of the State Medical Board."73 If utilization review
decisions are not the practice of medicine on the state level, they should fall
under ERISA protection to provide some measure of recovery to the plan
member for denial of treatment/benefits.
In Rudolph v. Pennsylvania Blue Shield, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
allowed a physician to legally challenge the validity of a utilization review that
found a lack of medical necessity and thus refused reimbursement." The
critical question, then, is whether or not a patient, who is denied a telemedicine
consultation or a referral to another physician based on a telemedicine
consultation, can hold the provider liable for the patient's inability, be it
financial or physical, to seek a source of treatment external to the telemedicine
program. If the telemedicine system is linked with an HMO-type program, the
provider could theoretically be liable for harm to a patient when the provider
knows the telemedicine system is used as a putative filter to decide whether a
patient should be reimbursed for prospective in-person health care. Although
the digital provider would not itself be making any medical decisions,
physicians working within the confines of a system are limited to the inherent
diagnostic capabilities of that system. If the digital provider is aware of, or
should be aware of, certain diagnostic loopholes that are likely to evade
physician detection, it is quite possible that a corporate provider could be held
liable when the system has the practical financial impact of denying healthcare
coverage.
that recommended care is not medically necessary, and therefore not covered by insurance or
the health plan, will not affect the treatment ultimately received by the patient"; see also Cypress
Fairbanks Med. Ctr. Inc. v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 110 F.3d 280, 283 (5th Cir. 1997)
(citing Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 236, 246 (5th Cir. 1990)
("recogniz[ing] the'commercial realities' facing third-party providers of health care services. ..
one of the first steps in accepting a patient for treatment is to determine a financial source for
the cost of care to be provided")).
2 Utilization review refers to an external evaluation of the appropriateness of a given course
of treatment based upon established clinical criteria. See Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
984 F. Supp. 49,50 n.9 (D. Mass. 1997) (citing Dukes v. US. Healithcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350,352
n. I (3d Cir. 1995)) cert. denied 116 S. Ct. 564; see also Corcoran v. United Health Care, 965
F.2d 1321, 1323 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992).
71 99 Op. Att'y Gen. 044 (Ohio Aug. 31, 1999).
' See Rudolph v. Pennsylvania Blue Shield, 717 A.2d 508 (Pa. 1998).
7S See id.
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C. Licensure
Another barrier to providers of clinical telemedicine occurs when a doctor
provides services across state and national boundaries. Although the practice
of medicine does not vary significantly from state to state, in both the United
States and Canada, each country's states (or provinces) require doctors
practicing within its borders to be licensed within the state. In the United
States, such power to regulate local activities is granted to the states by the
Tenth Amendment,76 and in Canada the practice of medicine is likewise
regulated on the provincial level." In Australia, on the other hand, doctors
must register to "protect the public by establishing and enforcing standards of
practice. '78  But, Australia is "arguably better positioned"79 than either the
United States or Canada to deal with licensure issues because Australia
operates under a mutual recognition scheme embodied by the Mutual
Recognition Act of 1992 on the Commonwealth level and its mirror legislation
in the States and Territories, 0 wherein each state reciprocally recognizes
medical licenses (or "registrations") issued by other states. Nonetheless, even
with Australia's reciprocal licensing, issues still arise regarding jurisdictional
choice of law questions.8 '
Thus, in all three countries, the federated treatment of licensure issues
inhibits telemedicine because each state defines the "practice of medicine"
differently: in terms of whether or not medicine is being practiced and, if so,
where the practice is taking place, and thereby subject to regulation." Lately,
76 See Phyllis F. Granade & Jay H. Sanders, The Licensure Issue in Telemedicine, I NEW
MED. 47-49 (1997).
" See Ronald S. Sleightholm, Symposium: Telepractice 2000, Toronto, Ontario, May 1998
(stating that "in Canada the regulation of most health care professionals is a matter of provincial
responsibility").
" See Interprofessional Working Group on Health Professions Regulation (IWHPR), Views
on licensure and regulation ofhealthcareprofessionals, v. 84 no. 2 FEDERATION BULLETIN 183
(1997).
79 See Milstein, supra note 3:
"o See, e.g., Mutual Recognition (Victoria) Act 1983, which is specifically imposed upon
medical practitioners pursuant to section 4 of the Medical Practice Act 1994 (Victoria).
" See Milstein, supra note 3 (warning Australian telemedicine providers that they may be
subject to suit in a foreign jurisdiction).
32 See id. discussing FCA 1074, Evidence given on May 16, 1997, where the Australian
Medical Council observed, in its submission to the House of Representatives' inquiry into
telehealth, that State medical acts will need to be amended to define a medical service or
treatment) (noting that "nearly [fifty] statutory definitions exist" in the United States and that
those definitions are so broad that "any attempt by a physician to consult a patient via
telemedicine or otherwise generally results in the practice of medicine."
2002]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
however, U.S. states have begun to recognize their mutual interest in allowing
some form of licensure reciprocity wherein a doctor licensed in one state is
allowed, with some limitations, to practice medicine in another state. 3 Indeed,
state licensure of medicine is much less logical than state licensure of the
practice of law because the practice of medicine does not vary significantly
from one modem state to another. 4 Even if a state-to-state system of
reciprocity is established, questions will still remain as to where the doctor is
held accountable. 5 Failure to address these questions could inhibit the
development of a telemedical system because a doctor may be unwilling to
subject himself to suit in a distant and unfamiliar forum. The World Health
Organization has proposed making a doctor accountable in his home
jurisdiction but has yet to formulate a definitive policy.s"
D. Reimbursement
In the United States, a corporate provider of clinical telemedicine services
may likewise be restricted by statutory anti-kickback provisions on both the
s See Laura Keidan Martin, Not So Fast, It's Regulated Some Warnings for the E-health
Biz, BUSNESS LAW TODAY, Sept./Oct. 2000, at 10-12 (discussing the Federation of State
Medical Boards' (FSMB) 1996 endorsement of model legislation (the "Model Act") that would
create a "special-purpose license" to practice medicine across state lines for a doctor holding a
full and unrestricted license to practice medicine in any state. Under the Model Act, "[t]his
special-purpose license would not be required of doctors who engage in the practice of medicine
across state lines less than 'regularly or frequently,' meaning less than once a month, less than
ten patients per year or less than one percent of the doctor's practice. Nor would a license be
required for medical services rendered in emergency situations or for doctor- to-doctor
consultations across state lines, unless such consultations took place according to a formal,
contractual agreement. The FSMB specifically declined to endorse a model that would have
created a single, nationwide license to practice. Several states have adopted legislation based
on the Model Act, including Alabama, California, Montana, Oregon, Tennessee and Texas.
Others considered but rejected legislation based on the Model Act, including Maryland, North
Dakota and Wisconsin.).
" The Department of Defense (DOD).and the Veterans Administration (VA) are among the
most active proponents of telemedicine, ostensibly because their physicians are free to work
across state boundaries. See Report on Telemedicine, supra note 14, at 4.3.4.1.
" See RAYMOND W. PONG ET AL., TELEHEALTH AND PRACTITIONER LICENSURE ISSUES,
DISCUSSION PAPER FOR THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HEALTH INFO-STRUCTURE 4 (Jan. 1999)
(referring to accountability as the "jurisdiction that has the ultimate authority to investigate and
discipline telehealth practitioners when things go wrong or when patients lodge complaints").
"6 See Sleightholm, supra note 77 (stating "though it is tentatively proposed that
practitioners of telehealth would be governed by the rules and regulations which apply to them
in their own jurisdictions, there has been no official stance on this question ... Interprovincial
and international telepractice almost certainly will require legislative change.').
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federal and state levels. These provisions put restrictions on the payment of
funds to induce referrals. Federal anti-kickback provisions apply only to
payment under government health care payment programs such as Medicare
and Medicaid. 7 While providers need not pay much attention to federal anti-
kickback provisions, because Medicare and Medicaid typically do not cover
services or devices making use of Web-based technology," many states have
adopted analogous prohibitions that apply regardless of the payor8 9
Canada, with a largely socialized medicine system, has yet to adopt a
comprehensive telemedicine reimbursement policy," but some provinces
allow reimbursement."' Canada's failure to reimburse across the board for
telemedical services acts as an inhibitor to the technology because doctors are
reluctant to offer a service unless they can be assured that the market will bear
the cost.92 However, governmental reimbursement depends upon doctors
proving the efficacy of telemedicine. Thus, telemedicine in Canada faces a
"Catch-22" because its usefulness cannot be measured until it is implemented
on a large scale and this requires governmental reimbursement, which awaits
definitive proof of telemedicine's impact. 93
" See 42 U.S.C. § 1 320a-7(b); see also Office of Inspector General (OIG) Advisory Opinion
99-14 (Jan. 6, 2000) (holding that the use of federal grant funds and the continued operation of
a telemedicine network could, according to the circumstances, constitute grounds for the
imposition of sanctions for violations of the Anti-Kickback Law, pursuant to § 1 128(b)(7) and
§ I 128A(a)(7) of the Act).
" But see Telehealth Improvement and Modernization Act of2000: Hearings on S.2505,
106th Cong. (2000) (introduced by Senator J. Jeffords (R-VT) on May 4, 2000 to provide
increased access to health care for Medicare beneficiaries through telemedicine). For a recent
history of legislative treatment of governmental reimbursement for telemedicine services, see
generally, Comprehensive Telehealth Act of 1999: Hearings on S. 770, 106th Cong. (1999)
(statement of Sen. Kent Conrad: D-ND); Triple-A Rural Health Improvement Act of 1999:
Hearings on H.R. 1344, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Rep Jim Nussle: R-IA); Promoting
Health in Rural Areas Act of 1999: Hearings on S.980, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Sen.
Max Baucus: D-MT).
s See Martin, supra note 83 (discussing various state approaches).
9o See Pong, supra note 85, at 12 (stating that "[b]ecause of uncertainties and concerns about
the impact of telehealth, many third-party payers, including provincial/territorial Ministries of
Health, are reluctant to change reimbursement policies to fund telehealth").
9' Four Canadian provinces-Nova Scotia, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta-have
adopted reimbursement policies for their practitioners. See Industry Canada, supra note 38.
9 See Pong, supra note 85, at 3 (stating that "unless thereimbursement issue is appropriately
addressed, it is unlikely that telehealth will be implemented on a broad scale. Physicians are
unlikely to provide extensive telehealth services if they are not compensated, in one way or
another, for their time and effort.").
"' See id. at 12 (noting that "unless telehealth is practiced in real-life settings and on a much
broader scale, we will not be able to assess its impact and implications").
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E. Anti-Self-Referral
Similar to anti-kickback provisions, self-referral prohibitions on both the
federal and state levels in the United States provide potential barriers to the
provision of clinical telemedicine. These provisions regulate the referral of a
patient to another provider who has a financial relationship with the entity or
doctor making the referral. As with kickback prohibitions, federal restrictions
are not a major concern because they only apply when the payor is a federal
health care program and Medicare and Medicaid typically do not cover
telemedicine services. 9' However, because many state regulations apply
regardless of the payor, a providor of telemedicine will need to structure its
business model accordingly and may have to refrain from offering participat-
ing doctors equity interests or other financial incentives that induce referrals.95
F. Regulatory Agencies
In the United States, the regulatory environment for telemedicine is
crowded. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) regulate telemedicine providers. Marketing and
advertising are subject to FTC regulation, while the FDA is charged with
regulating medical devices and pharmaceuticals. The 1996 Telecommunica-
tions Act' mandates that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and
the states take measures to increase advanced telecommunications services
such as the requirement that the FCC assure that health care providers serving
rural areas have access to telecommunications services "necessary for the
delivery of health care" at rates that are comparable to those for similar
services in urban areas.97 Additionally, states may enact statutes that regulate
advertising of health services.9" In Australia, despite a distinct absence of a
national regulatory policy regarding telemedicine, the national government is
working to ensure rural access to telemedical services. 9
"' See The Stark Act (42 U.S.C. §l395nn); see also Martin, supra note 83, at 12-14.
9' See Martin, supra note 83, at 12-14 (discussing the range of state regulations: from
prohibitions that only bar referrals to entities in which a doctor has an investment interest, to
prohibitions that bar referrals to any entity with which a doctor has any compensation
relationship to prohibitions that provide for exceptions as long as the doctor's financial interest
is disclosed to the patient or as long as the physician refers within his or her group practice).
9 The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
" Report on Telemedicine, supra note 14, at 4.3.4.3.
See Martin, supra note 83, at 12-13.
" Accordingly, the Commonwealth Government intends to include a requirement for the
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G. Confidentiality
Telemedicine providers should be aware of privacy and confidentiality
concerns regarding the storage and dissemination of patient records.
Treatment of telemedicine privacy issues should not substantially differ from
treatment of "traditional" storage of electronic health records.' ° Although
many industry participants argue that government regulation is a superfluous
addition to self-regulation through internal organizational policy,'"' the Law
Council of Australia (LCA) noted that "[a] set of national principles, which are
not legislatively based, are [sic] relatively meaningless from a legal
perspective."1 2
While regulations exist at both the state and federal levels in the United
States, the broad requirements of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) 0 3 must be examined with scrutiny
because unauthorized disclosures can result in substantial civil and criminal
penalties. HIPAA directly regulates the security and privacy of electronic
health-care information maintained or transmitted by health-care providers,
health plans and health-care clearinghouses. The statute also indirectly
regulates patient information of other entities by requiring covered entities to
maintain contractual "chain of trust agreements" with all business partners to
provision of sixty-four Kbps ISDN services to at least ninety-six percent of Australia in its
Universal Service. See Report on Telemedicine, supra note 14, at 5.1.3.1.14.2.
'00 See J.P. Fanning, Confidentiality of Individually-Identifiable Health Information:
Recommendation for a Federal Law, A PAPER DELIVERED TO THE JoINT WORKING GROUP ON
TELEMEDICINE, May 21, 1998 at 14 (arguing that "many issues.. . can be dealt with by
thoughtful application of principles and practices we already know"); but see National Technical
Information Service, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE TELEMEDICINE REPORT TO CONGRESS (1997)
(arguing that "telemedicine technology brings with it concerns about privacy, security and
confidentiality that go beyond those associated with protecting medical records... [and that]
because of the unique combination of patient data, video imaging, and electronic clinical
information that is generated between two distant sites during a telemedicine encounter, privacy
concerns that normally pertain to patient medical records may be magnified within the
telemedicine arena or may be different in character altogether").
10 See National Research Council, Computer Science and Telecommunication Board, For
the Record: Protecting Electronic Held Information (1997) at 166 (arguing that
"[o]rganizational policies and practices are at least as important an element of security [as is
legislative intervention]").
'02 Law Council of Australia, Non-Binding Privacy Principles of Concern, AUsTRALAN
LAW., Apr. 1998, at 1.
'03 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, §
262(a), 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29 and 42
U.S.C.A.); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1320d to 1320d-8 (West Supp. 1998).
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ensure that those partners institute appropriate procedures to ensure confidenti-
ality.
HIPAA regulations impose a wide array of security requirements such as
certification requirements, data back-up plans, personnel security, regular virus
checks, access-control features, security incident procedures, authentication
requirements, and prior authorization by patient before individually identifi-
able health-care information may be used or disclosed for a variety of
purposes.'" Two requirements that have particular relevance to telemedicine
are the requirements that all health information be kept in electronic form'0
and that each individual be given a unique health identifier.'O° Acting in
combination, the provisions create a series of nationwide and potentially
interconnected databases of individually-identifiable medical records.0 7
In Australia, there is more concern with linking multiple databases and
including individual identifiers. The Australian government's proposal for an
Australia Card, which was to be a unique identifier for every Australian, was
met with intense debate between 1985 and 1987 and the proposal was
permanently tabled due to privacy concerns. Although such a database would
have enabled many demographic studies and allowed better enforcement of
laws, the Australian public thought the benefits were outweighed by the
potential invasion of their privacy.'08 Although Australia has no legislation
which protects privacy across all jurisdictions,"° it has developed an
Australian standard: "Personal privacy protection in health care information
"o See Martin, supra note 83, at 13-14.
'0' 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1320d-2, 1320d-4 (West Supp. 1998) (requiring health plans to conduct
electronic transactions when requested, either directly or through a clearinghouse, which
implicitly requires the information to be available in electronic form).
'06 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d-2(b)(1) (West Supp. 1998).
"07 See Eric Wymore, Do You Know Where Your Medical Records Are? Medical Record
Privacy After the Implementation of the Health Insurance Portability andAccountabilityAct of
1996, 19 HAMLINE J. PuB. L. & POL'Y 553 (1998).
"o See Ian R. Cheong, Privacy and Security of Personal Health Info., J. INFORMATICS IN
PRIMARY CARE, Mar. 1996, 15-17, available at http://www.netreach.netl-wmanning/auspriv.
htm (visited Sept. 4, 2001).
" See id. (noting that there is only a Commonwealth Privacy Act 1988, which does not
apply outside Commonwealth organizations or to any private sector organization. The
Australian states do not have any privacy legislation, though New South Wales is working on
a bill); see also Milstein, supra note 3 (illustrating the Australian privacy "patchwork quilt" by
noting the existence of "the Federal Privacy Act, the Victorian Health Services Act 1988
(particularly section 141); the National Principles for the Fair Handling of Personal
Information published by the Federal Privacy Commissioner, a series of standards promulgated
by Standards Australia (for example, the Standard Personal Privacy in Health Care Information
Systems AS4400-1995); and the Victorian Data Protection Framework bill.").
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systems."'"o The standard is a statement of general principles and procedures
and is not currently a prescriptive technical document, though technical issues
will be addressed. "' The standard anticipates situations involving cross-border
information transmission and thus reflects international data management
standards. 112 In addition to legislative standards, Australia has appointed a
Privacy Commissioner to oversee national privacy policy."'
As with Australia, Canada has enacted standards reflecting international
privacy standards. Canada's privacy policy has been described as a
"patchwork" because jurisdiction is shared by both the national and provincial
governments. "4 The Canadian Standards Association (CSA) Model Code for
the Protection of Personal Information,"' is a voluntary code intended to
harmonize Canadian standards with the same OECD code on transborder
personal data flow with which the Australian standard complies. On the
federal level, the protection of personal information only applies to informa-
tion that is in the public sector." 6 While such information is also regulated
according to provincial and territorial laws, regulations, and guidelines, with
the exception of Quebec," 7 no state has a comprehensive policy that covers
data in both the public and private sectors. In October 1998, however, the
federal government introduced legislation that would cover private sector data
for a limited time period."' Similarly, the Canadian Institute for Health
Information (CIHI) recommended that the CSA's Model Code for the
"0 Australian Standard: Personal Privacy Protection in Health Care Information Sys.
Standards Australia (1995).
.. See Cheong, supra note 108.
112 For example, the standard references various OECD guidelines such as: Guidelines on the
protection ofprivacy and trans-border flows ofpersonal data, Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, Paris, 1981; Guidelines for the security of information systems,
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, 1992. Likewise, the Standard
incorporates British Standards such as: British Standard BS7799: A code of practice for
information security management, British Standards Institution, Watford, 1995.
11 See Kevin O'Connor, Confidentiality, privacy and security concerns in the modern
healthcare environment, v. 26 no. 3 AUSTRALIAN COMPUTER J. 70-77 (1994) (noting the
Commissioner's broad approach to privacy concerns stems from a belief that privacy is
considerably more encompassing than either "security" or "confidentiality").
"4 See Report on Telemedicine, supra note 14, at 5.2.3.1.11.
"' Colin J. Bennett, The Canadian Standards Association Model Code for the Protection of
Personal Information: Reaching Consensus on Principles and Developing Enforcement
Mechanisms, at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacy/selfreg4.htm#4D (last visited Sept. 4,
2001).
" See Report on Telemedicine, supra note 14, at 5.2.3.1.11.
"7 See Bennett, supra note 115.
.1. Bill C-54, the Personal Information and Electronic Documents Act.
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Protection of Personal Information be adopted." 9  This patchwork of
regulation has inhibited the development of telemedicine systems in Canada
because the variety of standards have interfered with creation of requisite
economies of scale that allow the operation of a healthy business model.
Likewise, as in any industry, uncertainty interferes with capital formation.
V. CONCLUSION
Telemedicine applications have the potential to drastically alter the delivery
of medicine. However, the scattered legal treatment of telemedicine lacks
logical coherence. As a result, the introduction of new digital technologies are
inhibited in the United States, Canada, and Australia. Thus, the national
legislature in each nation needs to address telemedicine needs in each country
to answer timely and important questions. Without a definitive statutory
response, the capital markets are forced to conjecture as to whether or not
traditional legal principles apply to the regulation of telemedicine.
"' See Industry Canada, supra note 38.
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